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Improving safety climate and behavior through a 
multifaceted intervention: Results from a field experiment 
 
Abstract 
Interventions aimed at increasing priority for employee safety could lead to better safety 
climate and safety behavior of employees. However, current studies reporting on safety 
climate interventions lack diversity in contexts and settings, they focus mainly on 
supervisors and do not take into account the implementation process of the intervention. We 
aim to add to the safety literature by testing the effects of a multifaceted safety climate 
intervention using a field experimental design. We analyzed data of 520 health care 
employees in five organizations and studied the effects of the implementation process. 
Results showed that safety climate and behavior scores were significantly higher at post-
intervention among the intervention group as compared to the control group, while there 
were no differences pre-intervention. Results also showed that within the intervention group, 
employees who experienced more positive changes to work procedures and positive 
attitudes and actions of their supervisor towards the intervention experienced higher post-
intervention safety climate and safety behavior. This study presents a new, multifaceted 
safety climate intervention strategy that can be useful for improving safety climate and 
safety behavior. It also shows the importance of the implementation process when 
conducting safety climate interventions. 
 
Keywords 
Safety climate, safety behavior, field experiment, senior management, supervisor, 
coworkers, implementation process 
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1 Introduction 
The occupational health and safety literature has identified many factors that contribute to 
health and safety in the workplace (Hofmann et al., 2017). One of the factors that received a 
lot of attention is the safety climate concept. Several studies have shown that safety climate 
plays an important role in workplace health and safety outcomes of employees, mainly 
through its influence on safety behavior (Christian et al., 2009; Clarke, 2010). Given the 
amount of correlational evidence regarding the relationship between safety climate and 
safety behavior, the number of intervention studies is surprising. Yet intervention studies are 
important for establishing causal relationships between safety climate and safety behavior, 
studying the improvement and implementation of changes in safety climate and a better 
collaboration between researchers and practitioners to increase our understanding of the 
safety climate concept in theory and practice (Kristensen, 2005).  
Indeed, a handful of studies have tested the effects of an intervention on employees’ 
perceptions of safety climate and safety outcomes such as safety behavior, safety 
knowledge, safety violations, and safety leadership (Zohar, 2002; Zohar & Luria, 2003; 
Zohar and Polachek, 2014; Nielsen, 2014; Mullen & Kelloway, 2009; Von Thiele Schwarz et 
al., 2016; Kines et al., 2010; Naveh & Katz-Navon, 2015). Nevertheless, these studies leave 
three important gaps in our knowledge on safety climate improvement.  
First, the interventions in these studies were primarily focused on changing 
supervisory interaction with employees, which is in line with the emphasis that is placed on 
the pivotal role of direct supervisors in relation to safety climate (Zohar, 2002; Zohar & Luria, 
2003). However, notwithstanding this importance, the influence of other safety agents such 
as (co)workers and senior managers has also been stressed in the safety literature 
(Chiaburu & Harrison, 2008; McGonagle et al., 2014; Zohar, 2014). Over the years, 
research has examined the multifaceted nature of the safety climate concept and proved 
that it references multiple levels in the organizational hierarchy (e.g. Zohar & Luria, 2005), 
including senior management and coworkers (Yule et al., 2006; Brondino et al., 2012). 
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However, senior managers’ priority for safety and coworkers safety norms have not (or only 
marginally) been included in safety climate interventions.  
Second, the current safety climate intervention studies were mostly located in 
industrial settings (such as metal processing, construction, and manufacturing) with a focus 
on physical accidents and hazards. As the targets of safety climate perceptions are context-
dependent (Zohar, 2010), these interventions may not provide the most optimal leverage 
points for safety climate improvement in other organizational contexts (for instance self-
managing teams, emphasis on teamwork) and types of safety risks and hazards (for 
instance psychological health and safety risks). Since health and safety issues are relevant 
to a wide range of organizations and industries, it is important to investigate the effects of 
safety climate interventions across various settings. 
The third gap is that previous safety climate intervention studies were mainly 
concerned with the effects of the intervention itself on safety outcomes, ignoring the 
implementation process of the intervention and its influence on the intervention effects. 
Addressing the conditions under which interventions are likely to be most effective is needed 
to achieve more valid evaluations of safety climate interventions (Pedersen et al., 2012; 
Nielsen, 2013). Authors such as Randall and colleagues (Randall et al., 2009; Randall & 
Nielsen, 2012) argue that including information on the implementation process could provide 
some protection against the threat of Type III error. That is, concluding the intervention is 
ineffective when it is in fact the faulty implementation that leads to failure (Dobson & Cook, 
1980).  
 This paper aims to fill these gaps by testing the effects of a multifaceted safety 
climate intervention and its implementation process in the health care sector. The 
multifaceted safety climate intervention incorporates different safety climate agents to 
improve safety climate and safety behavior, including senior managers, supervisors, and 
employees. We must note that our safety climate intervention is not focused on patient 
safety climate, but on employee safety climate in health care (that is, the climate concerning 
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health and safety of health care employees). Unless stated otherwise, the term ‘safety 
climate’ in our study thus always refers to employee safety and not to patient safety. The 
study is guided by two main research questions: 1) “Does a multifaceted safety climate 
intervention improve safety climate and safety behavior?” and 2) “Under which conditions 
does a multifaceted safety climate intervention improve safety climate and behavior?” To 
answer these questions, we conducted a field experiment with a pretest-posttest control 
group design among 520 employees working in five health care organizations. 
 
1.1 Improving safety climate 
Safety climate refers to the perceptions employees have of the policies, procedures and 
practices concerning safety within the organization (Zohar, 1980). In one of the first papers 
on safety climate, Zohar (1980) points to the informative function of the concept regarding 
the relative importance of safety versus other competing task domains (such as productivity 
or cost-reduction). The safety climate concept therefore reflects the priority of employee 
health and safety compared to other priorities within the organization (Zohar, 2008). Thus, 
an intervention to improve safety climate should explicitly signal to employees that 
workplace health and safety is a priority in the organization and that behaviors that improve 
this are expected. Despite the fact that many researchers follow Zohar’s (1980, 2008) 
conceptualization of safety climate, there is not much consensus on the clarification of the 
concept in terms of its operationalization or dimensionality (Flin et al., 2000; Zohar & Luria, 
2005). This makes it difficult to pinpoint specific intervention targets that will demonstrate the 
priority of health and safety over other demands. However, some common themes within the 
literature have emerged (Flin et al., 2000; Bronkhorst et al., 2015), which provide important 
leverage points that can be used to improve safety climate perceptions. We will discuss 
three of these common themes.  
 
1.1.1 Senior management priority for safety 
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One of the key dimensions of safety climate is management commitment to safety (Flin et 
al., 2000). As organizations are hierarchical in structure, employees will form perceptions of 
management commitment at multiple organizational levels. Zohar and Luria (2005) argue 
that safety climate can be meaningfully constructed at the group level and at the 
organizational level, so as to reflect supervisors’ and senior management’s influence on 
safety. The role of senior management in establishing organizational priorities and allocating 
resources is one of the reasons this safety agent is generally acknowledged as the main 
influencer of safety climate (Flin et al., 2000; Bosak et al., 2013). By using their power over 
time, money and people, senior managers are able to show the relative importance of safety 
within the organization. However, there are only a handful of studies including senior 
management in their safety climate intervention. Zohar and Luria (2003) for instance include 
higher-level managers by providing them with summary information about safety-related 
interaction between supervisors and employees, and instructed them to share this 
information with subordinate supervisors. The intervention tested by Nielsen (2014) included 
the CEO in staff meetings where he informed employees about the company’s safety status. 
Similarly, Naveh and Katz-Navon (2015) asked senior management to send a support letter 
to all employees backing the organization’s vision about safety. In all three studies, senior 
management’s priority for safety is demonstrated through a top-down, one-sided information 
exchange.  
A different approach to modify senior management priority for safety has been 
developed in the related field of patient safety climate through so-called ‘Leadership 
WalkRounds’ or management safety rounds. These were first introduced in 1999 by the 
Institute for Healthcare Improvement and conceptualized by Frankel et al. (2003) as a tool to 
improve management commitment to safety by providing an informal method for senior 
managers to talk about patient safety issues with employees. In contrast to the way senior 
management was included in the safety climate interventions described above, leadership 
safety rounds provide two-way interaction between senior managers and employees. This 
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facilitates a learning process and increases employees’ participation opportunities (Luria & 
Morag, 2012). Empirical research has shown that leadership safety rounds have positive 
effects on patient safety climate and reinforces patient safety as a priority within the 
organization (Singer & Tucker, 2014; Thomas et al., 2005). To our knowledge, there is only 
one study that investigated leadership rounds for employee safety, namely Luria and Morag 
(2012). They examined the introduction of a ‘safety management by walking around’ 
intervention using a case study method. Although the authors did not study its effects on 
safety climate, their results showed that safety rounds increased and improved interaction 
between managers and employees about safety. Based on their experience, these authors 
argue that “such an intervention should highlight for employees the importance of the safety 
facet relative to other organizational facets” (2012: 256). Attempts to increase perceived 
senior management priority for safety by introducing safety rounds thus seem promising.  
 
1.1.2 Supervisor commitment to safety 
Supervisors play a pivotal role in showing employees the priority of safety, as they inform 
them on the kinds of behavior that are valued and supported in the workplace (Zohar, 2002). 
The daily interaction between employees and management is therefore considered as one 
of the building blocks of safety climate. Not surprisingly, most of the safety climate 
intervention studies are primarily focused on increasing perceptions of supervisor 
commitment to safety. Zohar (2002), Zohar and Luria (2003), Zohar and Polachek (2014), 
and Kines et al. (2010) all tested whether providing coaching and feedback information to 
supervisors on their daily messages improved employees’ perceptions of the priority of 
safety. Overall, the results from these studies showed that the coaching and feedback 
changed the type of messages employees perceived from their supervisors (i.e. more 
safety-related messages), which is indicative of a modified priority for safety. In turn, this 
resulted in changes in safety climate and other safety outcomes such as safety behavior 
and safety audit levels. 
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Another extensively researched topic that has been linked to supervisor commitment 
to safety is transformational leadership (Pilbeam et al., 2016). Safety-specific 
transformational leadership (SSTL) is a leadership style focused on enhancing workplace 
safety, and is, in line with general transformational leadership, composed of idealized 
influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration 
(Barling et al., 2002). Supervisors high in SSTL are expected to demonstrate high priority 
given to safety through their own behavior, encourage employees to reach high levels of 
safety, suggest new and innovative ways of reaching safety, and show concern for their 
employees’ health and safety (Barling et al., 2002). In a study situated in a long-term health 
care organization, Mullen & Kelloway (2009) tested the effects of a SSTL training 
intervention for supervisors on safety outcomes. The results showed that the leadership 
training resulted in a significant increase in employee scores on perceptions of safety 
climate. Other experimental studies on the effects of (general) transformational leadership 
training confirm these findings (Barling et al., 2002; Zohar, 2002; Von Thiele Schwarz et al., 
2016). In conclusion, empirical research clearly indicates that increasing perceived 
supervisor commitment to safety through coaching, feedback or SSTL training results in 
overall safety climate improvement. 
 
1.1.3 Group norms and group behavior in relation to safety 
Finally, research has shown that employees do not only take cues from supervisors and 
senior managers with regard to workplace health and safety, but also from their coworkers 
(Jimmieson et al., 2016). Employees in organizations generally consider themselves as 
members of groups. The norms developed by these groups contribute to the safety climate 
perceptions of employees belonging to these groups, and consequently influence their 
behavior (Fogarty & Shaw, 2010). In their study on perceived safety norms, Fugas et al. 
(2011) showed that employees’ perceptions of coworkers’ descriptive safety norms directly 
influenced their safety behavior, whereas supervisor safety norms did not. They conclude 
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that interventions should explicitly consider the role of coworkers as a source of normative 
influence. In line with this, Meliá et al. (2008) identified coworkers as a safety agent as 
important as senior managers and supervisors.  
Considering the influence of coworkers as safety agents, Brondino et al. (2012) 
argued that safety climate interventions should target teams and workgroups to strengthen 
group norms for safety. Among other things, they suggest the introduction of short safety 
meetings to discuss safety issues and propose ways to improve safety (Brondino et al., 
2012: 1854). A safety intervention tested by Kines et al. (2013) provides an example of this. 
The authors introduced safety meetings (between employees and led by managers) aimed 
at increasing “participants’ dialogue and ownership of dealing with current safety issues 
through identifying and discussing safety perceptions, attitudes, what works well (why and 
how), and what needs improvement” (2013: 94). Unfortunately, Kines et al. did not measure 
the effects of the intervention on employees’ perceptions of safety climate. However, 
considering the opportunities these types of safety meetings provide to discuss and improve 
group norms and behavior (and thereby establishing a priority for safety among employees), 
they might contribute to safety climate improvement. 
 
1.2 A multifaceted approach to safety climate improvement 
Given the several leverage points outlined above, a multifaceted intervention approach 
appears to be the optimal choice to improve safety climate. As Zohar and Luria (2003: 20-
21) argue: “the organizational context must be better integrated in intervention programs, 
taking into consideration that changes taking place at any hierarchical level must be 
supported by concomitant change at other levels [..]”. This suggests that interventions aimed 
at increasing supervisor commitment to safety should be complemented by interventions 
that involve senior management and (co)workers. Two examples of this are the studies by 
Kines et al. (2013) and Nielsen (2014). In their study, Kines et al. (2013) tested the effects 
on safety perceptions of several intervention activities taking place at different organizational 
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levels (informal safety meetings between workers and management safety coaching). 
Qualitative findings from interviews with managers and employees indicated that the 
intervention activities improved attitudes towards safety, and showed signs of safety culture 
change. Nielsen (2014) also reported the results of an intervention program consisting of 
activities involving different stakeholders (e.g. safety information provided by CEO, safety 
staff meetings and safety themed workshops for safety representatives). The results showed 
significant, positive changes in safety climate perceptions at post-intervention, indicating that 
using different leverage points to modify employee perceptions is a successful strategy to 
improve safety climate. Moreover, in a comparison of successful and unsuccessful safety 
culture interventions, Hale et al. (2010) found that involving all employees across 
organizational levels (i.e. introducing a multifaceted intervention) in an environment where 
safety issues are openly discussed is a distinguishing factor. Considering the overlap 
between safety culture and safety climate, this may also be the case for safety climate 
interventions. 
Following these approaches to safety climate improvement, we developed a 
multifaceted safety climate intervention program that aims to modify employees’ safety 
climate perceptions through the improvement of employee perceptions of senior 
management priority, supervisor commitment, and group norms and behavior in relation to 
health and safety (see Methods section and Appendix A). As the main goal of our 
intervention program is to improve safety climate perceptions, we first need to examine its 
effect on safety climate. Hypothesis 1 is as follows: 
 
H1: Compared to a control group of employees, employees who are subject to the 
multifaceted safety climate intervention will report higher levels of safety climate at post-
intervention. 
 
1.3 The effect of safety climate improvement on safety behavior 
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The main premise of safety climate perceptions is that they inform employees of the priority 
of safety in the workplace (Zohar, 2010). The relative importance of employee health and 
safety versus other organizational goals (most often productivity) shows the extent to which 
safety compliant or enhancing behavior is supported and rewarded at the workplace. In their 
model of safety behavior, Griffin and Neal (2000) make a distinction between two types of 
behavior: safety compliance and safety participation. Safety compliance describes the core 
activities that need to be carried out by employees to ensure safety rules and regulations 
are followed (in health care this for instance includes using patient-lifting devices or adhering 
to incident reporting procedures). Safety participation refers to behaviors that do not directly 
contribute to an individual’s personal safety, but which do help to develop an environment 
that supports safety (for instance helping others with patient-handling or voluntarily attending 
safety meetings). Based on expectancy-valence theory (Vroom, 1964), the safety climate 
literature states that workers will be motivated to show safety compliant or participative 
behavior if they believe that these behaviors will lead to valued outcomes (Zohar, 2008). As 
our multifaceted safety climate intervention includes activities that place emphasis on the 
importance and value of safety in several ways, the relative priority of this subject will –
presumably- increase. As a result, employees will perceive that behaving healthy and safely 
during work time is valued by the organization. We therefore expect that, in addition to its 
effect on safety climate, the safety intervention program will also improve safety behavior 
among the intervention teams.  
 
H2: Compared to a control group of employees, employees who are subject to the 
multifaceted safety climate intervention program will report higher levels of safety behavior 
at post-intervention. 
 
1.4 The effect of the safety climate implementation process 
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The study of interventions in organizational settings is inherently difficult and complex (Biron 
& Karanika-Murray, 2014). In contrast to experiments taking place under controlled 
circumstances, organizational intervention studies are conducted in a natural setting where 
many factors are not under the researchers’ control. Participants may not use materials, 
resources or procedures recommended by the researchers, or they may not use it as 
planned (Murta et al., 2007). To truly determine whether an intervention has had the desired 
impact on the outcomes under study, it is therefore crucial to understand the implementation 
process by which the intervention is delivered (Egan et al., 2009). This also applies to safety 
climate intervention studies, where the success of activities aimed at changing employees’ 
perceptions of the priority for safety also depends on, for example, motivation of managers 
to introduce changes and the possibilities for learning within the organization (Hale et al., 
2010). 
 Several researchers have outlined how different characteristics of the 
implementation process and the intervention context may influence the impact of a health 
and safety intervention. These for instance include employee involvement in the planning 
and content of the intervention, readiness for change, and employee mental models 
(Nielsen & Randall, 2013; Nielsen et al., 2015; Biron & Karanika-Murray, 2014). In this study 
we focus on two aspects of the implementation process: changes made to procedures as a 
consequence of the intervention, and supervisors’ attitudes and actions towards the 
intervention. 
 The importance of employee participation in organizational interventions is widely 
known. However, some scholars state that, especially in the case of health and safety 
interventions, overall exposure to intervention activities alone does not result in positive 
intervention outcomes. They argue that the perceptions of employees of the impact of the 
intervention on changes in their work situation might be more important (Hasson et al., 
2014; Randall et al., 2009). Hasson et al. (2014) for examples showed that employees who 
reported that the intervention activities had a positive impact on their work showed 
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significantly more improvements in the outcomes as compared to those who perceived no or 
a negative impact. In a study that evaluated the process of teamwork implementation, 
Nielsen and Randall (2012) found that in order to be successful, the intervention had to 
involve changes to work procedures. Thus, interventions are more effective when 
employees experience that they bring about changes in their daily work. This implies that, 
regardless of the content of the intervention, the success of an intervention depends upon 
the extent to which it gives rise to actual changes to daily work practices and procedures 
(Nielsen & Abildgaard, 2013). Following this line of reasoning, our multifaceted safety 
climate intervention will improve safety climate and –behavior more effectively, if employees 
report that the intervention activities actually changed work procedures. 
 
H3: The extent to which employees report changes in work procedures brought about by the 
safety climate intervention will be positively related to safety climate and safety behavior at 
post-intervention. 
 
Another important aspect of the implementation process is the role that supervisors play in 
shaping interventions. The social interaction between supervisors and their employees 
determines the impact of an intervention, as supervisors influence the way their employees 
perceive an intervention and whether or not they decide to participate in the intervention 
activities. This makes supervisors powerful actors in the implementation process: they can 
either ‘make or break’ an intervention (Nielsen, 2017). Randall et al. (2005) for instance 
found that supervisors actively resisted the implementation of changes by not 
communicating the intervention to their employees. A few years later, Randall et al. (2009) 
tested the effect of supervisors’ attitudes and actions towards a team working intervention 
and found that the positive outcomes of the intervention were mainly driven by the attitudes 
and behavior of the supervisor, which involved positive communication about the 
intervention, active involvement of employees, and sharing information. Apparently, the 
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more positive the values, attitudes and behaviors of the supervisor towards the intervention 
are, the greater the likelihood that employees will actively engage in the intervention 
themselves (Nielsen, 2013). Given the fact that, in most cases, supervisors are responsible 
for day-to-day intervention implementation (Kompier et al., 2000), their influence on 
intervention outcomes should not be underestimated. The supervisor plays an important role 
in our multifaceted safety climate intervention, not only because they are the ones to show 
an increase in commitment to safety, but also because they influence employees’ choice to 
participate in intervention activities aimed at increasing senior management priority for 
safety and group norms and behavior. We therefore expect that the effectiveness of our 
multifaceted safety climate intervention is related to supervisors’ attitudes and actions 
towards the intervention. 
 
H4: The extent to which employees report that their supervisor shows positive attitudes and 
actions towards the safety climate intervention will be positively related to safety climate and 
safety behavior at post-intervention. 
 
2 Methods  
2.1 Design and participants 
The study was conducted in five Dutch health care organizations: two organizations 
providing care for disabled people, one organization providing mental health care, one home 
health care organization and one hospital. The project was designed as a quasi-
experimental field study with pre-intervention (T1) and post-intervention (T2) measurements 
and comparison groups (intervention- versus control group). The ethics committee of the 
Erasmus School for Social and Behavioural Sciences declared that the methods of data 
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collection and data analyses were in line with all ethical norms and values for this type of 
research. The study was pre-registered in the Dutch Trial Register with number NTR53911.  
Entire teams of employees were selected to participate in the study either as a 
control or intervention team to prevent contamination of the control group resulting from an 
exchange of information between control- and intervention employees working closely 
together in the same team (Cook & Campbell, 1979). Four out of five organizations agreed 
with random assignment of teams to control- or intervention group. In one organization, 
supervisors were asked whether they were interested to let their employees participate in a 
health and safety intervention. Although the employees in this organization were not 
randomly assigned, we did not find any significant differences between employees 
participating in the control or intervention group in pre-intervention safety climate and safety 
behavior scores, nor did we find significant differences in work- and background 
characteristics (see also Results section).  
A total of 1,323 employees working in 91 teams participated in the study, of which 45 
teams (630 employees and 37 supervisors) were assigned to the control group and 46 
teams (693 employees and 37 supervisors) to the intervention group. All employees in both 
groups were invited to complete an online survey during a five-week period before the start 
of the intervention program, which lasted for six months. They were asked to fill in another 
online survey directly after the program finished. All 1,323 employees were invited for pre- 
and post-intervention surveys. In the end, we were able to match 520 employees who 
                                            
1 In this article, we present the results directly after the intervention (post-intervention, shown as T1 in the register). In line with 
good practices for pre-registration and promoting an open research culture (Nosek et al., 2015), we indicate which reported 
outcomes were in line with the pre-registration and which were not. The primary outcome was improvement of safety climate 
scores directly post-intervention. This is in line with the pre-registration. A secondary outcome was that we also expected 
improvement of safety knowledge score at post-intervention. However, we did not find these results for safety knowledge (F(1, 
513)= .01, p>.05) and for safety motivation (F(1, 513)= .20, p>.05). Another secondary outcome was the intervention effect on 
safety behavior. We expected this result to be present only at the first follow-up measurement six months after post-
intervention (so not directly post-intervention). As we already saw results directly post-intervention, we decided to report them 
here. Lastly, we did not hypothesize the impact of the implementation process in the pre-registration (hypotheses 3 and 4 in 
this study). We decided to include these effects due to enhanced insights we gained during the intervention. 
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completed both pre- and post-intervention surveys (39.3% response rate). From these 520 
employees, 258 employees belonged to the intervention group and 262 employees 
belonged to the control group. 
All participating teams consisted of employees providing direct care to patients or 
clients, which resulted in the exclusion of administrative, technical or supporting teams. 
Supervisors assigned to the intervention group could not supervise an intervention team and 
a control team simultaneously. Employees in the control group did not participate in the 
intervention program and carried out their work as usual. To prevent that employees and 
supervisors in the control group became aware of their control group status, all 
communication about the intervention program was exclusively directed at employees and 
supervisors assigned to the intervention group.  
 
2.2 The safety climate intervention  
Based on safety climate literature we developed a six-month intervention program that 
consisted of three activities that intervened through the three leverage points outlined 
above. The interventions included 1) the introduction of senior management safety rounds, 
2) safety-leadership (SSTL) training for supervisors, and 3) the use of an online discussion 
platform for team members (‘Synmind’) to give their opinion on health and safety issues 
followed by regular team-meetings to discuss the online results. The intervention phase 
lasted for six months and was composed of three consecutive rounds with different themes, 
each lasting two months. In each round, the three intervention activities were carried out. To 
help plan and monitor the intervention activities, a local project manager was appointed at 
each of the participating organizations. An overview of the safety climate intervention 
activities, rounds and themes is presented in Figure 1. A survey was administered to all 
employees in the intervention- and control group before and directly after the intervention. 




Overview of the safety climate intervention program 
 
2.3 Measures 
All items were translated to Dutch and tested in a pilot group of five health care employees. 
Feedback was given on the terms used, wording and relevance of the items for their daily 
work tasks. All items were measured on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from a low score of 
1 (strongly disagree) to a high score of 5 (strongly agree). Appendix B shows an overview of 
the items used for each measure. 
Safety climate – Safety climate was measured at pre- and post-intervention (T1 and 
T2) among all employees in the intervention- and control group using an adapted version of 
the PSC-12 four-factor scale originally developed by Hall et al. (2010) to measure 
psychosocial safety climate. Two previous studies added a fifth factor to address another 
important employee safety climate dimension: group norms and behavior concerning 
employee health and safety (based on coworker safety items developed by Brondino et al., 
2012). These two studies showed good internal validity and reliability (Bronkhorst, 2015; 
Bronkhorst & Vermeeren, 2016). Although the scale was originally developed to measure a 
specific form of safety climate (psychosocial safety climate), we chose to slightly adapt it so 
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we could use it for our wider conceptualization of safety climate including both physical and 
psychosocial health and safety among employees. For example, words and phrases that 
refer to ‘psychological health’ were substituted by ‘health and safety’ and ‘the prevention of 
stress’ was replaced by ‘the prevention of health and safety issues’. Cronbach’s alpha 
values for all five subscales were acceptable at both T1 and T2 (ranging from .80 to .90).  
Safety behavior – A six-item scale developed by Neal and Griffin (2006) was used to 
measure safety behavior in the workplace at pre- and post-intervention (T1 and T2) among 
all employees in the intervention- and control group. This scale is composed of two factors: 
safety compliance and safety participation. Each factor was measured by three items. 
Internal consistency for both subscales was adequate with Cronbach’s alpha values of .76 
and .82. 
Changes to procedures – To measure the extent to which the intervention program 
brought about positive changes in the day-to-day work of employees, we used a five-item 
scale based on the ‘exposure to intended intervention’ scale developed Randall et al. 
(2009). This variable was measured at post-intervention (T2) among intervention group 
employees only as it concerns a variable on the implementation of the intervention. 
Supervisor attitudes and actions – This was measured using five items from the 
scale developed by Randall et al. (2009). This variable was – like changes to procedures – 
measured at post-intervention (T2) among intervention group employees only as it concerns 
a variable on the implementation of the intervention. 
Control variables – Five work- and background characteristics were added as control 
variables: age, gender, organizational tenure, contract hours and educational level. These 
variables were measured at pre-intervention among all employees in the intervention- and 
control group. 
 
2.4 Statistical analyses 
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As safety climate is theoretically considered a group- or organizational level variable (Zohar, 
2010), we tested whether aggregation to the team level was appropriate for our data. Inter-
rated agreement and reliability measures (rWG(J) and ICC(1,2)) indicated that it was not 
meaningful to aggregate safety climate perceptions and perform multilevel analyses. 
Therefore, this study uses individual perceptions of safety climate, commonly referred to as 
psychological climate (Christian et al., 2009; Clarke, 2010). 
To test hypotheses 1 and 2 concerning the effect of the intervention program on 
safety climate and -behavior we conducted repeated measures multivariate and univariate 
analyses of covariance (RM MANCOVA and RM ANCOVA) with time (T1 and T2) as a 
within-person factor and group (control group vs. intervention group) as a between-person 
factor. Age, gender, organizational tenure, contract hours and educational level were added 
as covariates. 
Next, to test the whether there is a relationship between the implementation process 
and safety climate and safety behavior at post-intervention (hypotheses 3 and 4), we 
performed OLS regression analyses with post-intervention measures as the dependent 
variables and implementation process variables as independent variables, controlling for 
work- and background characteristics and pre-intervention measures. 
 
3 Results  
3.1 Descriptive statistics and preliminary analyses 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations for the study variables. We tested 
the key assumptions before we conducted the analyses to test our hypotheses: the 
assumption of normality of error terms, homogeneity of variances and regression slopes, 
and the independence of the independent variable and covariate. All assumptions were met. 
Independent t-tests were conducted to examine whether there were significant differences in 
work- and background characteristics such as age, gender, organizational tenure, contract 
hours, or educational level between the two intervention conditions. There were no 
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significant differences in work- and background characteristics between employees 
assigned to the control- and intervention group. 
  
3.2 Intervention effects on safety climate and safety behavior 
The results of the RM (M)ANCOVA’s testing the effects of the intervention on safety 
outcomes are presented in Table 2. Hypothesis 1 predicted that the intervention program 
would have a positive effect on levels of safety climate for the intervention group compared 
to the control group. Because the activities that comprise our safety climate intervention are 
focused on the different dimensions of safety climate, we tested the effect of the intervention 
program on both the composite safety climate score and the individual safety climate 
dimension scores. The 2 (time) x 2 (group) MANCOVA of the five safety climate dimensions 
indicated that there was no significant group effect (F (5, 509) =1.95, ns) or time effect (F (5, 
509) = .59, ns). Yet, there was a significant group x time interaction effect (F (5, 509) = 4.46, 
p< .01, partial η2 = .04), showing that the changes in safety climate were different for the two 
groups. RM ANCOVA’s for each safety climate dimension followed up the multivariate 
results. 
The follow up tests revealed significant group x time interactions for the following 
safety climate dimensions: senior management priority (F (1, 513) = 8.95, p< .01, partial η2 = 
.02), group norms (F (1, 513) =12.03, p< .01, partial η2 = .02), and communication (F (1, 
513) =6.51, p< .05, partial η2 = .01), but no significant interaction for the supervisor 
commitment (F (1, 513) = 1.12, ns) and participation (F (1, 513) = .28, ns) dimensions. The 
mean scores presented in Table 2 and the interaction plot in Figure 2 show that the 
significant interactions for senior management priority, group norms, and communication 
were due to the control group decreasing from pre-test to post-test scores whilst the 
intervention group increased from pre-test to post-test. The composite safety climate pre-
test and post-test scores show the same pattern with a significant group x time interaction (F 
(1, 513) =8.08, p< .01, partial η2 = .02). Hypothesis 1 is therefore supported by the data.
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Table 1  
Means, standard deviations and correlations for the study variables 
 
Control group Intervention group  
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) 
Safety outcomes             
1. Safety climate (T1) 3.36 (.59) 3.41 (.59) (.93)          
2. Safety climate (T2) 3.28 (.63) 3.46 (.50) .52** (.93)         
3. Safety behavior (T1) 3.29 (.61) 3.30 (.63) .45** .26** (.81)        
4. Safety behavior (T2) 3.22 (.57) 3.36 (.55) .30** .46** .42** (.82)       
Implementation process             
5. Changes to procedures - 2.82 (.66) .30** .42** .21** .31** (.85)      
6. Supervisor attitudes and actions - 3.23 (.72) .25** .50** .11 .24** .54** (.90)     
Control variables             
7. Gender (1= female) .85 (.36) .83 (.37) .07 .10* .04 -.02 .02 .04 -    
8. Age 44.7 (11.1) 45.7 (11.6) .09* -.04 .12** .17** -.04 -.12 -.09* -   
9. Organizational tenure 4.39 (1.64) 4.34 (1.62) .03 -.01 .07 .13** -.02 -.05 .03 .51** -  
10. Contract hours 3.38 (.59) 3.35 (.60) -.12** -.05 .01 .05 -.02 -.01 -.26** -.06 .02 - 
11. Educational level 4.26 (.87) 4.21 (.80) -.07 -.10* -.10* -.13** -.05 .02 -.07 -.19** -.02 .16** 
*p<.05. **p<.01. 
N (variables 1-4, 7-11) = 520 (intervention group (N = 258), control group (N = 262)) 
N (variables 5 and 6) = 258 (intervention group only) 
Cronbach’s Alpha values are presented on the diagonal 
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Table 2 
Repeated measures (M)ANCOVA results of the effect of the safety climate intervention on differences in safety climate and safety behavior 
between control and intervention groups  
 Control group Intervention group Group Time Group x Time interaction 
 
T1 Mean (S.D.) T2 Mean (S.D.) T1 Mean (S.D.) T2 Mean (S.D.) F (df) F (df) F (df) Partial η2 
         
Safety climate 3.36 (.59) 3.28 (.63) 3.41 (.59) 3.46 (.50) 1.95 (5, 509) .59 (5, 509) 4.46** (5, 509) .04 
Senior management priority  3.13 (.81) 3.05 (.83) 3.16 (.77) 3.28 (.69) 4.60* (1, 513) .01 (1, 513) 8.95** (1, 513) .02 
Supervisor commitment 3.69 (.80) 3.56 (.82) 3.78 (.72) 3.71 (.69) 4.72* (1, 153) .52 (1, 513) 1.12 (1, 513) .00 
Group norms and -behavior 3.59 (.63) 3.49 (.74) 3.61 (.70) 3.73 (.59) 7.27** (1, 153) .01 (1, 513) 12.03** (1, 513) .02 
Communication  3.26 (.71) 3.18 (.75) 3.28 (74) 3.35 (.65) 2.77 (1, 153) 1.56 (1, 513) 6.51* (1, 513) .01 
Participation  3.12 (.71) 3.10 (.72) 3.22 (.73) 3.23 (.62) 4.70* (1, 153) .02 (1, 513) .28 (1, 513) .00 
 
        
Safety behavior  3.29 (.61) 3.22 (.57) 3.30 (.63) 3.36 (.55) 2.17 (2, 512) .00 (2, 512) 4.29* (2, 512) .02 
Safety compliance 3.34 (.68) 3.27 (.67) 3.42 (.75) 3.41 (61) 4.27* (1, 513) .00 (1, 513) 1.11 (1, 513) .00 
Safety participation 3.23 (.73) 3.17 (.73) 3.18 (.71) 3.31 (.66) .66 (1. 153) .00 (1, 513) 8.47** (1, 513) .02 
         
*p<.05. **p<.01.  
Note: all results are controlled for the influence of differences in age, gender, organizational tenure, contract hours, and educational level 
N = 520 (intervention group (N = 258), control group (N = 262)) 
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The results from the 2 (time) x 2 (group) MANCOVA for the safety behavior dimensions 
showed that there was no main group effect (F (2, 512) =2.17, ns) or time effect (F (2, 512) 
= .00, ns), but there was a significant group x time interaction effect (F (2, 512) = 4.29, p< 
.05, partial η2 = .02). The univariate analyses that proceeded indicated that this significant 
interaction was mainly due to the intervention group changing significantly different from the 
control group when it comes to safety participation (F (1, 513) = 8.47, p< .01, partial η2 = 
.02). The changes for the safety compliance dimension were not significantly different for 
both groups (F (1, 513) = 1.11, ns). The composite safety behavior variable also showed a 
significant group x time interaction effect (F (1, 513) = 5.36, p< .05, partial η2 = .01). The 
mean scores in Table 2 and the interaction plot in Figure 2 show that the significant 
interactions are due to a decrease in safety behavior scores in the control group and an 










Plots of the intervention effect (interaction between group and time) on (a) safety climate 
and (b) safety behavior 
 
3.3 Implementation process effects 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 stated that characteristics of the implementation process (that is 
changes in work procedures brought about by the intervention and supervisor attitudes and 





















































and safety behavior. The results are presented in Table 3. The analyses showed that both 
implementation process variables were significantly associated with post-intervention levels 
of safety climate, controlled for pre-intervention safety climate levels. When we look at the 
standardized estimates, we find that the supervisor attitudes variable (β= .34, p< .01) has a 
stronger association with post-intervention safety climate than the changes in procedures 
variable (β= .12, p< .05). For safety behavior, we also found that both implementation 
process variables were significantly related to the post-intervention measurement. Here we 
see that, in contrast to safety climate, the changes to procedures variable (β= .15, p< .05) 
has a slightly stronger association with post-intervention safety behavior than supervisor 
attitudes and actions towards the intervention (β= .13, p< .05). Hypotheses 3 and 4 are thus 
supported by the data. 
 
Table 3 
OLS regression results of the relationship between the implementation process and post-
intervention measures of safety climate and safety behavior  
 
Safety climate T2 Safety behavior T2 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Pre-intervention variables     
   Safety climate T1 .53**  .41**   
   Safety behavior T1   .45** .40** 
Control variables     
  Age -.03 .03 .06 .09 
   Gender (1 = female) .07 .06 -.03 -.04 
   Organizational tenure -.04 -.04 .02 .02 
   Contract hours .00 -.01 .11 .11* 
   Educational level -.03 -.03 -.11 -.10 
Implementation process variables     
   Changes to procedures   .12*  .15* 
   Supervisor attitudes and actions   .34**  .13* 
     
ΔR2  .15  .06 
F for ΔR2  34.00**  10.64** 
Overall adjusted R2 .27 .43 .23 .28 
     
*p<.05. **p<.01.  
Note: Standardized coefficients (β) are shown. 
Assumptions of OLS regression were met. 
N = 258 (intervention group only) 
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4 Conclusions and discussion 
4.1 Discussion 
The current study was guided by two main research questions. The first research question 
concerned the effectiveness of a multifaceted safety climate intervention for employees’ 
safety climate perceptions and their safety behavior. The data revealed that our intervention 
including senior management safety rounds, SSTL training of supervisors, and team 
discussions about employee health and safety significantly improved composite safety 
climate and safety behavior. Looking at the effects of the intervention on the safety climate 
dimensions separately, we found significant positive effects for senior management priority, 
group norms, and communication. Although the SSTL training was specifically aimed at 
increasing supervisor commitment to safety, we did not find statistically significant 
improvements for this dimension. One possible explanation for not finding this effect could 
be that the time lag for evaluation of the intervention was too short to observe SSTL training 
effects. Donohoe and Kelloway (2014: 216) suggest “three months may be the minimum 
time frame required for changes in leadership to be implemented consistently, recognized 
by employees as a change, and to trickle down to affect employee attitudes and behaviors”. 
Since the post-intervention survey was timed only two months after last SSTL training in the 
third intervention round, the effects might not have been fully achieved. For safety behavior, 
we found that the intervention significantly improved the safety participation dimension, but 
the effects on the safety compliance dimension were non-significant. Although this is not in 
line with previous research indicating that safety climate is linked to safety compliance, a 
meta-analysis by Clarke (2006) demonstrated that a stronger relationship exists between 
safety climate and safety participation. That our intervention did not significantly improve 
safety compliance might be explained by the fact that the three activities that comprised our 
safety climate intervention primarily contributed to establishing a safety-supportive 
environment (a safety goal for safety participation; Griffin & Hu, 2013). The safety goal for 
safety compliance is to ensure employees work in a manner that adheres to organization-
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specific safety rules and regulations (Griffin & Hu, 2013). As the safety rules and regulations 
differ considerably between organizations and even between teams, we decided not to 
focus on the compliance of specific rules and regulations. Future safety climate intervention 
studies could incorporate safety compliance as a theme to discuss in team safety meetings 
or in senior management safety rounds. 
 Instead of modifying safety climate perceptions by using a single leverage point 
(Zohar, 2002; Zohar & Luria, 2003; Zohar & Polachek, 2014), our field experiment showed 
that a multifaceted intervention strategy targeting different levels can be effective. This result 
is especially important in sectors with a growing interest in self-managing teams, such as 
the health care and service sector (Van Mierlo et al., 2005). In particular in health care, the 
shift towards self-managing teams and the professionalization of the nursing profession has 
emphasized employee autonomy and reduced the authority and responsibilities of the 
manager (Wynd, 2003). This increases the influence that coworkers have on climate 
perceptions and behavior. A recent study on hand hygiene climate among nurses by 
Jimmieson et al. (2016) for instance demonstrated that the perceptions of daily practices of 
other nurses were more salient cues for shaping behavior than cues from managers or the 
hospital in general. Interventions based on daily interactions between managers and 
employees are therefore not as effective in contexts where managers’ visibility is low (Luria 
et al., 2008). This makes the evidence provided by our study on the effectiveness of a 
multifaceted intervention including group norms and –behavior particularly relevant.  
 The second research question concerned the conditions under which a multifaceted 
intervention improves safety climate and –behavior. Our results indicated that two aspects of 
the implementation process play a role: the extent to which the intervention brought about 
positive changes to procedures and the extent to which supervisors showed positive 
attitudes and actions towards the intervention. Besides the main effect of the safety climate 
intervention itself, our study revealed that the variability in the implementation process was 
linked to variability in safety outcomes. More specifically, we found that the intervention was 
more effective for employees in the intervention group that scored higher on perceived 
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changes to procedures and supervisor attitudes and actions. Although we have not fallen 
prey to a Type III error - concluding the intervention is ineffective when it is in fact the faulty 
implementation that leads to failure –we have shown that it is important for organizations to 
take the implementation process seriously. For an intervention to have its most optimal 
effect on safety climate, attention needs to be paid to the actions and attitudes of 
supervisors responsible for the implementation. This conclusion is in line with previous 
research on the importance of the supervisor in intervention implementation (Randall et al., 
2009; Nielsen, 2013). For the most effective change in safety behavior, however, the safety 
climate intervention also needs to result in actual changes to daily practices and procedures 
that influence employee health and safety. In other words: espoused values must becoming 
enacted values (Zohar, 2010), or espoused theory becoming theory-in-use (Argyris, 1995; 
Nielsen & Randall, 2012) in order for a safety climate intervention to optimally improve the 
safety behavior of employees. We would therefore recommend that future studies take 
these aspects of the implementation process into account, both in the design and evaluation 
of safety climate interventions. 
 
4.2 Strengths and limitations 
A key methodological strength of this study is that it used a field experimental design – with 
pretest-posttest design and comparison groups– to study the effects of an intervention. 
Given the dominance of correlational studies in safety climate research and the paucity of 
field experimental studies (Zohar, 2014), this can be seen as a useful addition to the 
literature. However, this study also has a number of weaknesses. Four are in our opinion 
particularly important.  
First, we were unable to make a distinction between the effects of different 
intervention activities. It would have been valuable to study which of the three types of 
activities had the largest effect. On the one hand, combining interventions can be useful for 
practitioners as multiple elements carry higher promise to influence safety climate and 
behavior. On the other hand, combined intervention strategies make it very difficult to 
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disentangle individual effects (Wassell, 2009:1054). Future studies could try to develop 
intervention studies using various treatment arms to disentangle individual effects and 
fruitful combinations.  
A second limitation deals with demand effects. Demand effects arise when 
respondents think they know what the study is looking for and are behaving differently as a 
result. However, it is unclear whether they would behave in line or against hypotheses 
(Zizzo, 2010). In the most harmful case, demand effects could result in higher safety climate 
and behavior scores in the treatment group which would have been absent if there were no 
demand effects. However, this is not to be expected, given that we did not find effects on 
every dimension of the safety climate construct. Moreover, we aimed to reduce demand 
effects by limiting information on the specific goal and hypotheses of the study and by not 
being present during the time that participants filled in the survey. However, future studies 
could try to further diminish such effects by for instance using multisource data (Zohar & 
Polachek, 2014; Von Thiele Schwarz et al., 2016), adding intervention arms with placebo 
treatments or using ‘filler’ activities (Mullen & Kelloway, 2009).  
A third limitation considers a possible bias that may have played a role in the lower 
safety climate scores among employees in the control group. As safety climate is based on 
perceptions of employees (Zohar, 2010), it could be the case that the administration of 
surveys without the implementation of any other related activities or changes in the 
workplace in the control group, may have triggered the unintended perception that employee 
safety is only regarded as paperwork in the organization (a ‘paper exercise’, see Goh and 
Goh, 2016). This bias could possibly provide an explanation for the lower scores on safety 
climate at post-intervention among the control group employees. 
 A fourth limitation is that we did not collect qualitative data on the intervention 
process. In recent years, several researchers have argued that in order to truly understand 
how, why and under which conditions an intervention works, the study of organizational 
interventions should employ a mixed method design (Nielsen, 2013; Nielsen & Abildgaard, 
2013; Pedersen et al., 2012; Abildgaard et al., 2016). The relevance of collecting qualitative 
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process data lies in its ability to provide a rich, and detailed understanding of the context 
and mechanisms that influence intervention effectiveness (Abildgaard et al., 2016). By only 
including aspects measured in the quantitative surveys, there is a risk we may have missed 
nuanced and complex factors in the organization that also affected the results of our safety 
climate intervention.   
 
4.3 Conclusions 
In conclusion, this study aimed to add to the safety climate literature by developing and 
testing the effects of a multifaceted safety climate intervention on the climate concerning 
employee safety and employee safety behavior. The intervention included 1) senior 
management safety rounds, 2) SSTL leadership training of supervisors, and 3) an online 
platform for team members to discuss safety issues followed by team-meetings. The results 
showed that our multifaceted strategy to safety climate improvement resulted in improved 
safety climate and safety behavior scores for the intervention group compared to the control 
group. Moreover, the study also revealed that the implementation process should not be 
overlooked. Activities undertaken to improve safety climate and –behavior are more 
successful when supervisors show positive actions and attitudes towards the intervention 
and changes are made to daily procedures relevant to employee health and safety. Based 
on these results, we can conclude that a multifaceted intervention including attention for its 
implementation is a useful strategy for safety climate and -behavior improvement. 
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Multifaceted safety climate intervention activities 
The safety climate intervention consisted of three activities that were repeated during three 
rounds with different themes. The first theme was physical health and safety in the 
workplace. Considering the work and daily tasks of long-term care employees, topics such 
as physical workload, quantitative work pressure and the use of lifting equipment were 
discussed. The theme for the second round was psychosocial health and safety. Example 
topics that were discussed here are qualitative work pressure, work-life balance, aggression 
and violence from clients, gossiping and interpersonal conflicts. The final round was themed 
organizational conditions for workplace health and safety. Topics such as the relationship 
between employee safety and client safety, legal and financial issues relating to safety, and 
the role of management could be discussed here. We made a protocol for each program 
activity, which was send to the organization’s project manager.  
 
Intervention activity 1: Senior management safety rounds  
As part of our safety climate intervention, we introduced senior management safety rounds 
in each of the organizations to improve employee safety climate through an increase in 
senior management priority for health and safety as perceived by employees. These safety 
rounds took the form of bi-monthly meetings between senior managers and employees 
assigned to the intervention group. During these meetings, employees were encouraged to 
have an informal conversation with senior managers about health and safety issues. The 
senior managers that participated in the safety rounds consisted of members of the board or 
senior line managers. At each organization, the project manager organized the safety 
rounds, made notes during the rounds and provided support to the senior managers. Safety 
rounds lasted for about 30-60 minutes and were conducted in the care setting of the 
employees. From each intervention team, one to three employees were asked to participate 
in the meeting. Employees prepared for these meetings by asking other team members 
(who were not able to join the meeting) which topics they should discuss with senior 
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management. The project managers made notes of the meetings and send these to all 
members of the team afterwards. 
 
Intervention activity 2: SSTL training for supervisors 
Supervisors in the intervention group participated in three half-day sessions aimed at 
improving their transformational leadership skills in relation to workplace health and safety. 
The sessions lasted for three hours and were led by professional team coaches familiar with 
the theory of SSTL. Each session started with a short theoretical discussion of the four 
dimensions of transformational leadership (inspirational motivation, idealized influence, 
intellectual stimulation and individualized consideration) followed by roleplaying exercises to 
practice with communication skills and implementing behaviors consistent with these 
dimensions. The team coaches asked the supervisors to use their new communication skills 
and techniques during the safety team-meetings (see intervention activity 3). 
 
Intervention activity 3: Online team discussion through ‘Synmind’ followed by health and 
safety team-meetings 
The third intervention program activity comprised two sub-activities both aimed at reaching 
consensus on group norms and group behavior concerning health and safety among 
employees working together. All intervention team members were invited to participate in an 
online discussion through the ‘Synmind’ platform. Synmind is a digital communication 
platform where health and safety norms can be scored and discussed online. For each 
round, we programmed six statements that employees scored and discussed. The full list of 
statements is shown in the table below. Anonymity during the online discussion was 
guaranteed by the exclusion of participants’ names. Employees had two weeks to respond 
to the statements. After the online discussion period, the results were sent to the 
supervisors in order for them to prepare the second sub-activity: a face-to-face team 
meeting during which the entire team discusses the outcome of the online discussion. These 
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meetings were presided by the supervisors, who could implement behaviors and 
communication skills introduced in the SSTL training sessions (see intervention activity 2). 
 
Round 1 statements 
Theme: Physical health and safety 
Round 2 statements 
Theme: Psychological health and 
safety 
Round 3 statements 
Theme: Organizational conditions for 
workplace health and safety 
1. When time pressure is high during 
work, it is impossible not to go beyond 
your own physical limits. 
1. We can tell each other everything in 
our team without it being discussed 
with others behind our backs. 
1. Employee health and safety is as 
important as patient/client health and 
safety. 
2. It is possible to make sure no one in 
our team experiences excessive 
physical load, even when we are 
understaffed. 
2. If one team member’s work pressure 
is too high, we will address this as a 
team and resolve it together. 
 
2. The procedures we follow to ensure 
patient/client health and safety are 
aligned with the procedures we follow 
to ensure our own health and safety. 
3. Coworkers in our team inform each 
other adequately when there are new 
methods or when there is new 
equipment available to prevent physical 
strain in the workplace. 
3. During busy periods, it is normal to 
still be engaged in work (physically or 
mentally) while at home, even though 
this hinders activities with 
family/friends. 
3. Due to recent legislative changes in 
the health care system, it will become 
more difficult to ensure employee 
health and safety 
4. A change of work schedules is 
needed in our team to prevent physical 
strain in the workplace. 
4. The prevention of work stress is the 
responsibility of the employer 
(organization). 
4. Even without additional funding, we 
can find (new) ways to ensure 
employee health and safety in the 
workplace. 
5. Every member of our team corrects 
a coworker when they see them lifting 
or moving incorrectly, irrespective of 
age or tenure. 
5. If team members have difficulties 
carrying out their work because of 
circumstances in their private life, they 
should discuss this in the team. 
5. The management is willing to hear 
our opinions and make ample use of 
our experience when making decisions 
concerning employee health and 
safety.   
6. I will not be able to reach my 
retirement age doing this job if the 
physical load in my work remains the 
same. 
6. The difference between teasing and 
bullying someone is clear to all 
members in our team. 
6. I would recommend my organization 
as employer to my family and friends. 
 
Appendix B 
List of items used in study 
Safety climate (based on Hall et al., 2010 and Brondino et al., 2012) 
Senior management priority for health and safety 
1. Employee health and safety is a priority for this organization 
2. Senior management considers employee health and safety to be as important as productivity  
3. Senior management shows support for physical and mental injury prevention through involvement and commitment 
Supervisor commitment to health and safety  
4. In the workplace, my supervisor acts quickly to correct problems/issues that affect employees’ health and safety 
5. My supervisor clearly considers the physical and mental health and safety of employees to be of great importance 
6. My supervisor acts decisively when a concern of an employees’ physical or mental health or safety status is raised 
Group norms and –behavior in relation to health and safety  
7. In our workplace, we discuss employee health and safety hazards and incident prevention 
8. In our workplace, we care about peers’ physical and mental health and safety awareness 
9. In our workplace, we remind each other of the rules and regulations regarding employee health and safety 
Communication about health and safety 
10. There is good communication here about health and safety issues which effect me 
11. Information about workplace health and well-being is always brought to my attention in this organization 
12. My complaints, remarks and contributions to resolving health and safety concerns in the organization are listened to 
Participation and involvement in relation health and safety 
13. Participation and consultation in employee health and safety occurs with employees, works councils and health and 
safety coordinators 
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14. Employees are encouraged to become involved in employee health and safety matters 
15. In my organization, the promotion of employee health and safety involves all levels of the organization 
 
Safety behavior (based on Neal & Griffin, 2006) 
Safety compliance 
1. I use all the necessary health and safety equipment and follow relevant regulations to prevent physical and mental strain in 
my job 
2. I use the correct procedures and regulations for health and safety when carrying out my job 
3. I ensure the highest levels of health safety when I carry out my job 
Safety participation 
4. I promote the employee health and safety program within the organization 
5. I put in extra effort to improve employee health and safety in the workplace 
6. I voluntarily carry out tasks or activities that help to improve employee health and safety 
 
Changes to procedures (based on Randall et al., 2009) 
1. As a consequence of the implementation of the program activities we openly discuss which methods or procedures we 
wish to change and which we wish to keep 
2. New procedures have been introduced or existing procedures have been changed after the implementation of the program 
activities 
3. Through the implementation of the program activities we finally got to straighten up some bad work methods that we had 
accepted 
4. The implementation of the program activities has made it easier to tackle the changes in the organization 
5. I have changed my attitude to the role of my supervisor after the implementation of the program activities 
 
Supervisor attitudes and actions (based on Randall et al., 2009) 
1. My supervisor has done a lot to involve employees throughout the activities of the program 
2. My supervisor communicated clearly the advantages of the program activities 
3. My supervisor shared whatever he/she knew about the implementation of the program activities 
4. My supervisor has actively worked towards the implementation of the program activities 
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